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The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing
to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises
the question as to how to deﬁne kindness. In this paper we offer a new deﬁnition
of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states
that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social
situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i,
while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that
was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more
unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If,
however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his
actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive
and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal
behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in
a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for the
theory.
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11 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a growing literature on the theory of reciprocity. Founded
on the seminal work of Rabin [18]—further extended by Falk and Fischbacher [10],
Dufwenberg and Kirschteiger [5] and others, and generalized by Sobel and Segal [21]—
the theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to re-
ward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones.1 This assumption raises the question
of as to how to deﬁne “kindness.” In this paper we offer a deﬁnition of kindness that
we call blame-freeness. The notion that we propose is a natural, intuitive and empiri-
cally relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. We
develop the conceptual framework and then test it in a laboratory experiment involving
tournaments.
Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind
or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strate-
gic position of player i, while retaining intrinsic characteristics of his preferences (i.e., j
does not become i but simply takes his strategic position), and ask if he would have
acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would
have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for
his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames
i” for his actions—i.e. i’s actions were blameworthy. Furthermore, if blame is a source
of disutility, j may have the motivation to punish i whenever possible even if the pun-
ishment is costly for him. Note that blameworthiness is only a necessary condition for
punishment while blame-freeness is a sufﬁcient condition for non-punishment. In other
words, in the strong form of the theory, we should never observe any player punishing
those whose actions are judged blame-free, i.e., actions which they themselves would
have taken if they were in the same situation as the other player.
This way of viewing kindness is distinctly different from others in a number of ways.
First, as stated in Schotter [19], blame-free justice is an endogenous, process-oriented
theory in which people judge the actions of others by their own standards and personal
norms but not by some exogenous standard imposed on them by the analyst.2 Blame-
freeness allows the standards that people use to judge the actions of others to differ
from person to person depending on their personal norms and background. Indeed,
actions that bother you may not bother other people at all, and things that strike you
to be fair may be very upsetting to others. In addition, the theory is not independent
1For a comprehensive survey on reciprocity see Sobel [23].
2The most notable exogenous norm is egalitarianism or inequality aversion studied by Bolton, Fehr
and Schmidt [12] or Bolton and Ockenfels [2].
2of the context.3 For instance, actions that are blame-free in a prison (or a college dorm)
may certainly be blameworthy in normal civilian life. One cannot judge the behavior
of people in isolation—we need to know the institutional setting they are in. Finally,
as stated above, blame-freeness judges the actions of people that lead to outcomes and
not merely the outcomes themselves. So, it is also a process-oriented theory. This is
counter to those theories that are outcome-based. Finally, our theory is distinct from
intention-based theories [1, 7, 10, 9, 8] since blame-freeness is totally self-referential: it
only matters what you would have done in your opponent’s situation and not what he
intended to do.
To put some ﬂesh on this notion of blame-freeness and to differentiate it from other
theories reciprocity, let us consider a few examples of how our analysis differs from
those of other scholars.
1.1 Rabin-Charness, Kindness, and Blame
In Rabin [18]’s theory of fairness, person j judges person i’s actions as being unkind if
they lead to a payoff for j that is less than 1/2 of the total payoff available along person
j’s payoff frontier, given j’s beliefs about what i thinks j will do. In other words, there
is a split-the-difference ethic imposed by Rabin that is supposed to deﬁne kindness no
matter what situation is under investigation.4 But what if i’s action led to a payoff for j
that was only 1/3 of the total available but j, if he was in i’s position, would have given
his opponent even less, say 1/6. Under what circumstance should j be upset with i While
he may not like his payoff, he certainly understands j’s actions and in fact, compared to
what he would have done, he must even consider i to be generous. The point, therefore,
is that feelings of justice, fairness and kindness are subjective and must emanate from
the person doing the evaluation himself. They should not be imposed from the outside
using some other (e.g. egalitarian) standard.
In a related paper, Charness and Rabin [4] deﬁne a “demerit parameter” which cap-
tures how a player feels towards his opponent. This parameter is determined by com-
paring the behavior of an opponent to what a “decent person” would do in his circum-
stances. In this approach, therefore, an opponent’s action is considered in relation to an
exogenously determined social norm, while in ours, the standard used to judge behavior
is endogenous and deﬁned by our blame-free norm.
3Gul and Pesendorfer [14] lay the foundations of interdependence between behavioral types, indepen-
dent of the environment decision-makers interact.
4It is important to point out that we are not criticizing Rabin’s speciﬁc kindness function here as much
as the use of any exogenously imposed kindness function.
31.2 Fehr-Schmidt, Inequality Aversion, and Blame
Mr. Nasty and Ms. Very Nasty play an Ultimatum game. Mr. Nasty offers Ms. Very
Nasty $1 out of $100 when placed in the proposer’s position. Ms. Very Nasty, on the
other hand, would offer only $ .50 if she were in that position. Ms. Very Nasty accepts
Mr. Nasty’s $1 offer. Why? Clearly from Ms. Very Nasty’s point of view she receives
an amount that is higher than the amount she would offer Mr. Nasty if she were the
proposer. In fact, Ms. Very Nasty might even gloat that Mr. Nasty offered her far more
than she would have offered him if she had been in his position.
To be more precise, consider an Ultimatum game played between two Fehr-Schmidt
(Fehr and Schmidt [12]) players, p (Proposer) and r (Receiver), each endowed with a
utility function of the form,
up(xp,xr) = xp − αp max{xr − xp,0} − βp max{xp − xr,0},
ur(xp,xr) = xr − αr max{xp − xr,0} − βr max{xr − xp,0},
where αi ≥ βi, and 1 > βi ≥ 0 for i = p,r. In such a game the Receiver rejects an
offer (xp,xr) if ur(xp,xr) < ur(0,0). In our formulation of blame-free theory the utility
functions of players are not restricted to be of any form. What is required is that a
Receiver blames—hence perhaps rejects—an offer if that offer is less generous than the
one he would have made, had he been in the Proposer position. Hence, under blame-
free hypothesis, the Receiver compares the offer (xp,xr) to what offer he would have
made if he were the Proposer, say (x∗
p,x∗
r). If ur(xp,xr) ≥ ur(x∗
p,x∗
r), he accepts, while
if ur(xp,xr) < ur(x∗
p,x∗
r), he blames. If blame causes a disutility for the receiver, he may
even reject the offer.
1.3 Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger, Intensions, and Blame
One strand of reciprocity theory considers intensions as its focal point. Consider the
following game of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [5] (DK) presented in Figure 1. that
they use to motivate the relevance of intentions in modeling reciprocity.






4In this game Player 1 moves ﬁrst and can either play F or D. The question that DK
ask is under what circumstance can Player 1’s playing F be considered as kind. Their
answer is that whether Player 1’s action is kind or not depends on what his beliefs are
about what Player 2 is going to play. If Player 1 believes that Player 2 will play f, then
Player 1’s action of F will be considered unkind since it will reduce Player 2’s payoff
from 1 to 0. However, F will be considered a kind move if Player 1 believes that Player 2
will play d at his node. Hence, in their model while players’ beliefs about each other are
the center of attention, in our analysis we focus on the preferences of players when they
are placed in each others strategic position.
To elaborate on this distinction let us return to Figure 1. According to the theory of
blame-freeness in order to deﬁne whether a move of F is kind or unkind Player 2 must
place himself in the strategic position of Player 1 and ask whether he would have chosen
F if he were in Player 1’s position. For example, say that Player 2 is a strict egalitarian
(Fehr-Schmnidt) player who would prefer the outcome (1,1) to any other outcome in the
game. From his perspective, if Player 1 were to move F, he would immediately consider
such a move blameworthy (i.e., unkind) since he would never have chosen to do that.
Note that, unlike DK, no beliefs are required in order to make this judgment.
1.4 Levine, Altruism and Blame
Another popular theory of reciprocity is that of Levine [16] where the utility that a player
receives from his actions depend on his own and his opponents’ types. Since the types
are private information and drawn from a commonly known distribution, the game is
modeled as a Bayesian game. For Levine [16] there is a one-to-one mapping from the
“niceness” of one’s opponent’s actions to his type. The utility that a player receives from
an outcome is a function of the player’s “direct” and “adjusted” utility where the direct
utility (ui) is simply the player’s material payoff while the adjusted utility (vi) takes into
account his assessment of how nice his opponent is. More precisely Levine [16] posits a
generalized version of the following utility function:




−1 < ai,aj < 1 are the coefﬁcients of altruism (types) of players i and j respectively.
Note that given i’s altruism coefﬁcient, player i’s utility, vi, is an increasing function of
his assessment of j’s type, meaning that the nicer player i thinks that player j has been
the more he cares about his payoff. Under our theory, however, this judgement is a
relative one. Player i perceives player j as nice only if player j has taken an action which
is blame-free i.e., nicer than the action he would have taken if he were in j’s position.
5This distinction is meaningful. For example, say that ai = 0.9 while aj = 0.8; that is both
players i and j are “nice” but i is nicer than j. In the context of blame-free theory i would
blame j for not being as nice as he would be in j’s position. However in Levine [16],
player j is considered nice regardless of i’s altruism parameter. Put differently in our
model niceness is a relative concept, while in Levine [16] it is an absolute concept.
1.5 Overview and Summary
As we can see from the examples above, the essence of blame-freeness involves the
examination of a counter factual, i.e. imagining what you would have done if you were
in the position of the person whose actions you are judging. Although real world data
does not lend itself to such observations, in the lab it is possible to allow subjects to
play all roles in a game anonymously and then test to see if their behavior is consistent
with the blame-free hypothesis. The experiment demonstrated in this paper test this
hypothesis.
In the experiment, subjects engage in an asymmetric tournament identical to the one
used by Schotter and Weigelt [20] (hereafter SW), where players have different costs of
effort. In each round a subject plays in two tournaments; one in the role of the advan-
taged player (low cost) against a disadvantaged player (high cost), and another in the
role of the disadvantaged player against an advantaged player. In other words, subjects
play in both roles simultaneously in two tournaments with two different opponents who
are in the opposite roles. This experiment was used because it was noted in SW as well
as Kräkel [15] that asymmetry in tournaments lead to strong emotional responses to
the behavior of advantaged subjects whose impact we are attempting to capture here.
In addition to tournament stage, in our experiment, we have a punishment stage. In
the tournament stage of the game, subjects choose an effort level and then move to the
punishment stage where they can punish their opponent.
Since we are able to observe what a subject does when he is in the advantaged or
disadvantaged role, we can check if a subject punishes according to the predictions of
the blame-free theory—e.g. whether a disadvantaged subject punishes his advantaged
opponent for choosing an effort level that is above his own effort level in the advantaged
role. Note however, that although under the blame-free hypothesis while choosing a
blame-free effort in the tournament is a sufﬁcient condition for non-punishment, choos-
ing a blameworthy effort level is only a necessary condition for punishment. This is so
because whether a subject ultimately punishes his opponent depends not only on his
blaming him for his actions but also on the cost of punishment and how much blame
exists.
6The results of our experiment support the view that people consider blame as part of
their notion of kindness. Remembering that blame-freeness is a sufﬁcient condition for
non punishment, and focusing on disadvantaged subjects who are most likely to blame
their advantaged opponents for taking advantage of their positions, we see behavior
consistent with this view 81% of the time. In other words, when disadvantaged subjects
face advantaged opponents who choose lower effort levels than they do when placed in
their position, they fail to punish them 81% of the time. On the other hand, blamewor-
thy acts only constitute a necessary condition for punishment. Of the sub-sample that
assigned punishment points to their opponents, 73% punish blameworthy acts at least
50% of the time.
The actual adherence to blame-freeness cannot be determined from these numbers
since, as we have said, blameworthiness is only a necessary condition for punishment
(many factors mitigate its inﬂuence such as the cost of punishment, the sensitivity of
blame etc.). Consequently, these statistics are a lower bound on adherence to the theory.
Some probit regressions run also indicate that it is the actions of opponents that spark
blame and not the ﬁnal payoffs since adding payoffs as a dummy variable in the probit
regression is not signiﬁcant once actions are accounted for. This means subjects were not
focusing on the payoff distribution of the tournament game, as Fehr and Schmidt [12]
would predict, but both their payoffs and the strategies determining them. Intention-
based theories such as [18] also seems to have less explanatory power.
In summation, the evidence presented here suggests that a non-negligible part of
the population behave according to the prescriptions of blame-freeness. We believe that
this notion of justice has many advantages with respect to other fairness theories in the
literature. Not only does it allow us to relax the assumption that the most preferred
distribution is the egalitarian one, but it can also rationalize experimental data that has
not yet been explained by other fairness theories.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the blame-freeness concept in
a more rigorous manner and provides a formal example of how to compute blame and
equilibria in games exhibiting blame. Section 3 presents the theory of tournaments used
in our experiments and demonstrates how the inclusion of blame alters the standard the-
oretical results for such tournaments. In Section 4 we explain the experimental design.
Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Blame in Extensive Games
Before we can introduce considerations of blame into the tournament game that serves
as the basis of our experiment, it is necessary to pause and discuss the concept more
7abstractly so that we can establish exactly what we have in mind. Accordingly, in this
section, we discuss a ﬁnite extensive form game with complete and perfect information
where blame is a motivating factor. After we do this, we then integrate the concepts we
develop into our tournament model.
Players, actions, histories and preferences. Consider a game consisting of two play-
ers i = 1,2.5 The set of histories H is composed of the initial history ∅ as well as ﬁnite
sequences of players’ actions. We say that a history h is terminal if there is no action
proﬁle a such that (h,a) ∈ H. We call a terminal history an outcome and denote the set
of all outcomes by H, and the space of lotteries over the outcomes by ∆(H). Associated
with each terminal node is a prize for each player. Hence a prize function πi : H  → R
determines the prize πi(h) of player i associated with the outcome h ∈ H. We posit that
players have preferences over the space of lotteries over outcomes that are represented by
utility function vi : ∆(H)  → R.6
In order to get a meaningful answer to the question of what a player would do if
he were in the position of his opponent, we need to allow our subjects to differ in a
meaningful way since otherwise all players would act identically in every position they
found themselves and no blame could exist. While there are many ways to introduce
this difference, for simplicity, we assume that people differ according to their “caring
parameter”; bi indicates how much weight they place on their opponent’s payoff in their
utility function and the function is written as:
vi(h;bi) := πi(h) + biπj(h).
vi(h) depicts the fact that player i’s utility is determined as the sum of his prize and
a proportion of player j’s prize. The fraction bi ∈ [0,1] is the weight attached to other
player’s prize and we say that bi is player i’s caring parameter that describes his altruism
towards the other player. We stress, however that nothing in the theory of blame-freeness
depends upon this functional form assumption.
As a ﬁrst step, to answer what it means to put oneself in another’s strategic position
we assume that a player i is endowed with a function vij : ∆(H) → R that represents
his preferences over the space of lotteries over outcomes if he were in player j’s position.
Since these preferences are parameterized by player i’s caring parameter we will write
vij(  ;bi). It is important to note that when player i puts himself in player j’s position
5Although the notions that we discuss extend to the case of n ≥ 2 players with some effort, for exposi-
tional and notational ease we focus on two-player games.
6Segal and Sobel [21] focuses on the representation of strategic preferences and the existence of Nash
equilibrium when the players are strategic utility maximizers. Although there are minor differences in our
deﬁnition of strategic preferences, a careful modiﬁcation of their theorems also apply to our framework.
Since the scope of the present paper aims to emphasize different issues, we omit this exercise.
8he retains his own preferences over outcomes—i.e. his own caring parameter—so that
while he is in player j’s strategic position he views it from his own perspective.
Strategies. A strategy of a player i is a map σi that determines an action for each
non-terminal history h ∈ H \ H whenever it is player i’s turn to move. We write Σi to
denote the set of all strategies for player i and we write Σ := Σ1 ×Σ2. If a strategy proﬁle
σ = (σ1,σ2) leads to an outcome h ∈ H, we denote it by hσ whenever we want to refer
to the strategy proﬁle explicitly.
Strategic preferences. Since players blame others for their behavior that lead to ﬁnal
outcomes we need to include this behavior in a player’s utility function. To do this we
follow Sobel and Segal [21, 22] who demonstrate that under appropriate assumptions,
one can characterize a subject’s evaluation of the kindness of his opponent by a utility
function that increases a player’s caring parameter for opponents who behave kindly
and decreases it when an opponent behaves unkindly. In other words, reciprocity occurs
because a kind action by one’s opponent leads one to care more about him and therefore
take actions that are better for him. Conversely, an unkind action has the opposite
effect. In this paper the kindness function will be deﬁned via our notion of blame.7 To
formalize this we assume that in strategic environments, players have preferences over
the strategy proﬁles Σ = Σ1 × Σ2, which we call strategic preferences. These preferences
are represented by a strategic utility function ui : Σ → R.
As in Sobel and Segal [21, 22] this strategic utility function allows us to incorporate
the behavior of a player leading to an outcome as an argument in a player’s utility
function along with the outcome itself. In particular, we assume that players maximize
their strategic utilities when there is an explicit reference to the strategy that leads to an
outcome. While this assumption allows us to impose more structure on behavior, it does
not rule out the standard approach. Indeed, if a player i is indifferent between any two
outcome-equivalent strategies, his strategic preferences are equivalent to his preferences
over outcomes.
Blame. Our exposition so far is general. In what follows, we discuss our key blame
concept that deﬁnes a class of strategic preferences that characterize a player i who
evaluates an outcome reached through a strategy proﬁle (σi,σj) by asking himself:
What would I do if I were in player j’s position playing against strategy σi?
The function vij is key to answering this question. Being endowed with functions
(vi,vij), player i can judge an outcome from player j’s perspective. As a matter of fact,
7Sobel and Segal [21, 22] do not tie themselves to any speciﬁc notion of kindness since their analysis
is on a level of generality higher than ours. They do, however, suggest a few possibilities none of which
include blame.





player i’s answer to the previous question is:


















Let us explain this deﬁnition. If player i would play σij as a response to σi in player




. This is the utility he would get
if he played against someone like himself (in fact this is the utility he would receive if he





. So player i blames player j at σ when the utility he could enjoy if player j
was behaving exactly like he would is more than the utility he actually enjoys against
his true opponent. Note that player i does not blame j if j’s strategy led to a utility for
i that is larger than the utility i would have achieved if j had chosen strategy σij—i.e. if
he does not blame player j if he is nicer to i than he would have been to himself.
In order to capture the strength or intensity of this blame we deﬁne player i’s blame
function as fi(δσ
i ). For tractability we assume that fi is non-negative, continuous, non-
decreasing in δσ
i and zero when δσ
i ≤ 0.
Now we can deﬁne the strategic utility function for player i of type bi with reference





where βi(σ) := bi − fi(δσ
i ). That is, at the strategy proﬁle σ, player i’s utility of the
outcome hσ depends on σ by altering his caring parameter from bi to βi(σ). So in our
previous example, the strategic-utility of player i is
ui(σ) = πi(hσ) + βi(σ)πj(hσ).
Note that when fi(δσ
i ) > 0 player i blames player j for his actions under σ and when
fi(δσ
i ) > bi, the blame is so signiﬁcant that player i actually receives disutility from player






















10effort to restore his utility level. Also note that if δi(δσ
i ) < 0 then, since player i does not
blame the other player, we have ui(σ;bi) = vi(hσ; βi(σ)) and player j’s actions are blame-
free. When j’s actions are blameworthy, he is likely to be punished as long as the cost of
punishment is not too large. Hence, blameworthiness is only a necessary condition for
punishment while blame-freeness is a sufﬁcient condition for lack or punishment.
2.1 Equilibrium
Now we are ready to deﬁne the relevant equilibrium concepts in our context. Let Γ :=
(H,vi,vij,ui, fi)i=1,2 denote the game we deﬁned in Section 2.
Definition 1. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ if for all i,
ui(σ∗;bi) ≥ ui(σ′
i,σ∗
j ;bi) for all σ′
i ∈ Σi.
Given that the players are strategic utility maximizers, the equilibrium concept is
standard. Note, however, that the Nash equilibrium is deﬁned with respect to a player’s
strategic utility function ui(σ∗;bi) and not vi(hσ∗;bi). This means that the utility of play-
ers includes the entire strategy proﬁle (and hence blame if any exists) as an argument.
In order to incorporate sequential rationality in the solution concept we aim to reﬁne
the equilibrium in that direction. However, subgame perfect reﬁnement requires more
care since the strategic preferences depend on the blame factor at each history of the
game. In other words, at each subgame, a player will question why he is at that subgame
to begin with. We will discuss this issue in detail in what follows.
Let us write Γ(˜ h) :=
 
H|˜ h,vi|˜ h,vij|˜ h,ui|˜ h, fi
 
i=1,2 for the subgame of Γ that succeeds
history ˜ h ∈ H. The deﬁnitions of the constituents of a subgame, except for the strategic
preferences, are standard. H|˜ h is the set of sequences of actions such that (˜ h,h) ∈ H for
any h ∈ H|˜ h. The utility functions are








where (˜ h,h) ∈ H. For a strategy σi, we write σi|˜ h for the strategy that projects σi in Γ(˜ h).
That is σi|˜ h(h) := σi(˜ h,h) for all h ∈ H|˜ h.
The issue of deﬁning blame in a subgame is less straightforward. In a given subgame,
one can deﬁne blame by focusing only on the projection of the strategies in the subgame.
However, this deﬁnition would not address the question of why players are supposed
to play in that particular subgame. Therefore, a reasonable deﬁnition of blame should
be able to question the strategy proﬁle that takes players to a given subgame. In order




i , and hence βi(σ|˜ h) = βi(σ). In other words, the projection of a strategy proﬁle in
11any subgame yields the same blame term as it does in the entire game. Given our






Since our deﬁnition of a subgame is complete, we are ready to deﬁne subgame perfect
equilibrium of a game Γ.
Definition 2. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ if
(i) σ∗|˜ h is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(˜ h) for all ˜ h ∈ H \ H, and











for all σi ∈ Σi,
for all ˜ h ∈ H \ H.
The subgame perfect equilibrium has two requirements. The ﬁrst is a standard condi-
tion: no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy at each subgame
of the game. The second requirement asserts that if fi(σ) = 0 for all σ then σ∗
i |h is a best
response to σ∗
ij|h in each subgame Γ(h) for all i = 1,2. Put differently, if we modify the
game Γ to a game Γi where the utility function of player j is vj = vij, then (σ∗
i |h,σ∗
ij|h) is
a Nash equilibrium of subgame Γi(h) for all h ∈ H.
Let us elaborate more on the role of the second requirement. If a player i were playing
the game against himself,—i.e. in the position of player j with the utility function vij—
there should not be any blame involved in the strategic relationship. In other words, a
player should not blame himself in the equilibrium of the game if he were playing against
himself.
Let us illustrate the role of this condition with a simple example of ultimatum game,
where the players allocate a surplus of size 10. Suppose that regardless of whether he is
a responder or proposer, player i’s preferences are such that he prefers an allocation that
gives him more than 5 to any allocation that gives him less than 5. Also an allocation that
gives him 0 is always the least preferred allocation. Suppose that player i is the responder
and his strategy is to reject any offer that gives him less than 5. Note that if he were in the
proposer’s position his best response would be to offer 5 against that strategy. Therefore,
any offer that gives him less than 5 will make him blame the proposer. Observe that
blame originates from his own strategy that rejects any offer less than 5. Although this
strategy is not credible, it makes him blame a proposer who offers him less than 5. This
is the point where condition 2 becomes critical by requiring credibility of his strategy in
the hypothetical game where he plays against himself.
2.2 A Simple Example
To illustrate these ideas in a simple example, consider the following sequential game.














The ﬁrst line at the terminal histories is the prizes, the second line
is vi, and the third line is vij.
We will demonstrate that while the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this example
for selﬁsh rational players (bi = 0) results in outcome (r,b), when strategic preferences
are a function of blame, for some caring parameters, the only subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome is l. This is true because in the presence of blame following the history
r, player 2 can credibly play a if r is chosen. Note that at each terminal node we have
three sets of payoffs. The ﬁrst set of payoffs are the prize payoffs for each player at each
terminal node, πi(h), i = 1,2. However, these are not the utility payoffs at these nodes
since we have assumed that our players care about the prizes received by their oppo-
nents through their caring parameters. Hence according to a player’s preferences these
outcomes are evaluated as follows:
vi(h;bi) = πi(h) + biπj(h) for i, j = 1,2,
where bi ≥ 0, for i = 1,2. This yields the second set of payoff vectors in Figure 2.
For our analysis of blame we also need to know what each player would do if he
were in the strategic position of his opponent. Thus, we need to deﬁne the utility of each
player for all histories if that player were in the role of his opponent. These payoffs are
deﬁned as
vij(h;bi) = πj(h) + biπi(h) for i, j = 1,2.
In order to analyze the equilibrium of this game for players who maximize their strategic
utilities, we should determine players’ strategic preferences over all strategy proﬁles. Let









if and only if b1 ≤ 1/2. Furthermore the outcome (r,a) yields
the least utility for player 1 for any b1.
When player 1 plays r, he blames player 2 for playing a, because he would never









= 0. Hence player 1 would never choose a after history r in
player 2’s position.
Since player 1 blames player 2 at strategy proﬁle (r,a), we need to understand how
player 1’s blame affects his strategic utility. Note that β1(r,a) = b1 − f1(5 + 2b1) since
δ
(r,a)
1 = ((5+2b1) −0). For simplicity, let us assume that fi(δ
(r,a)
i ) = δ
(r,a)
i for all δi ≥ 0,
and zero otherwise, for i = 1,2. Then, for b1 ≤ 1/2, player 1’s strategic utility from the




= πi(h(r,a)) + β1((r,a))πj(h(r,a)) = 0 + (b1 − (5 +
2b1)) × 0 = 0. In contrast if player 2’s strategy is to choose action b at the history r,








since b is a blame-free action.
Also observe that if player 1 chooses l, he does not blame player 2 for any strategy
since what player 2 does does not affect his payoff; hence u1(l;b1) = 4+4b1. If b1 ≥ 1/2,
player 1’s most preferred outcome is l. But player 1 does not blame player 2 for either
playing a or b when he plays l.
The analysis of player 2’s strategic preferences is more interesting. Note that if player
2 were in player 1’s position his utility from outcome l is 4+4b2 while the outcome (r,b)
is 5+ 2b2. Thus, for any b2 ≥ 1/2, player 2 would prefer l over (r,b) if he were in player
1’s position. Consequently, player 2 blames player 1’s strategy r only if b2 ≥ 1/2; so let
us suppose that this is the case. In order to understand player 2’s thought experiment
assume that player 1 plays r. Player 2’s line of reasoning is as follows. If I were in
player 1’s position I would play l. That would result in a payoff of 4 + 4b2 as opposed
to 2 + 5b2 assuming I would react by b. Therefore, at strategy proﬁle (r,b) I blame him
by δ
(r,b)





= 2+ 5(2b2 − 2).










Simple algebra shows that player 2 with a caring parameter b2 ∈ [1/2,4/5) will play
a as a response to r, and plays b as a response to l. However, for b2 ≥ 4/5 player 2 will
play b in response to player 1’s action r. This is true because while player 2 still blames
player 1 for his choice of r, he cares so much about him that he refuses to punish him
for playing r.
To illustrate these ideas consider Figure 3.
Figure 3 depicts equilibrium of games with different combinations of caring param-












2: (r,b) 3: (l,b) 4: (r,b)
1: (l,b)
eters. The horizontal axis is b2 and the vertical axis is b1. In region 1, player 1 plays
his dominant strategy l, and all types of player 2 plays b in the subgame. Hence the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is (l,b) and it does not involve any blame. In
region 2, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, player 1 plays r and player 2 plays b. This
equilibrium does not involve any blame either simply because player 2 would have done
the same thing if here in player 1’s position. In region 3 player 2 blames player 1 if his
action is r. As a result, player 2 prefers to play a in response to r, and b in response to l.
Since player 1 prefers l over (r,a), in the equilibrium he plays l. In that scenario observe
that there is no blame in the equilibrium. But it is the “blame” that makes player 1 play
l. Finally in region 4, player 2 is altruistic enough (b2 > 4/5) that he does not punish
player 1’s action of r, even though he actually blames player 1.
3 Tournaments: A Simple Model
In this section we investigate the equilibrium effort level predictions of the tournament
game that serves as the basis of our experimental design. We investigate the case where
strategic utilities are determined by considerations of blame and players are strategic
utility maximizers. We discuss and state our results in the body of the text and present
the intuition of our argument, but do not burden the reader with formal proofs since
it is punishment behavior and not effort levels that is the main focus of our blame-free
hypothesis.
153.1 Uneven Tournaments without Blame
The experiment used to test our blame-free theory is one involving uneven tournaments
with punishments. In the standard treatment of such tournaments, no punishments are
used in the equilibrium since such punishments are not credible in the subgame perfect
equilibrium. We then introduce blame into the analysis and demonstrate how the results
predicted by the standard theory change.
An uneven tournament is a rank-ordered tournament where the cost of the exerted
effort is different for at least one of the agents. Under our design, subjects have the
chance to express their discontent with the outcomes of the tournament by reducing
the payoff of the other player. For the punishment stage of the game we follow the
linear punishment mechanism implemented by Fehr and Gaechter [11], Carpenter [3]
and Nikiforakis and Normann [17], among others.
More precisely, the experiment involved two stages. In Stage 1 the subjects played an
uneven tournament game identical to that used by SW. After the results of this tourna-
ment were known, they moved on to the punishment stage where they could use some
punishment points, D, given to them to reduce the payoff of their opponent. Such pun-
ishments were costly to the subjects since any punishment points not used could be kept
and converted into U.S. dollars. As is usual in these two-stage games with punishment,
a sub-game perfect equilibrium does not involve any punishment.
In Stage 1 each player i chooses an effort level ei ∈ [0, ¯ e], which generates an observ-
able output
yi = ei + ǫi,
where ǫi is the realization of a uniform random variable whose support is [−a,a] for
some a > 0. We assume that the random variables are identical and independent for the
two players. Exerting effort is costly for the players: For player 1 the cost of effort level e1
is (e1)2/c , whereas for player 2, the cost of effort e2 is α(e2)2/c, where c > 0,α > 1. The
output levels determine the payoffs of the tournament. If yi > yj then player i receives
M while player j receives m < M. Since the case y1 = y2 is a zero-probability event we
omit this case.
In the second stage of the game, players are given some information about what oc-
curred in Stage 1. In the experiment, the information given to them varies depending on
the treatment, which we will explain later. The players are endowed with D punishment
points. Once they receive the information about what happened Stage 1, they can use the
punishment points to decrease the payoff of their opponent. Each point that i assigns to
j (denoted as d
j
i) costs him one point and reduces j’s payoff by h points.
Given an effort proﬁle (e1,e2), player 1 wins the tournament if ǫ1 − ǫ2 > e1 − e2. We
16denote this probability by p(e1,e2) and given our uniform distribution assumption for ǫi














8a2 if 0 ≤ e1 − e2 ≤ 2a.
We can readily write the expected payoff of an outcome where the effort levels are e1,e2,






























where   := M − m.
We assume that players’ utility functions are
vi(h;bi) = πi(h) + biπj(h), vij(h;bi) = πj(h) + biπj(h).
Critically, since in this section we assume that the players are not motivated by consid-




for i = 1,2, where
0 ≤ bi ≤ 1 is player i’s caring parameter, reﬂecting his altruism for the other player. The





8αa2(1− b2) and state the equilibrium in the next Proposition:
Proposition 1. If strategic utility functions do not involve blame, then in the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game d
j


















when φ1 ≤ φ2.
Proof. See Fain [6] who treats that case where bi = 0,i = 1,2.
3.2 Uneven Tournaments with Blame
When considerations of blame exist the analysis of the tournament becomes slightly
more complicated and interesting. To start we assume that players’ utility functions are
vi(h;bi) = πi(h) + biπj(h), vij(h;bi) = πj(h) + biπj(h)




for i = 1,2, where bi ≥ 0, as
before, is player i’s caring parameter.
In our experiment we run treatments where only the disadvantaged subject can pun-
ish as well as ones where both the advantaged and disadvantaged subjects can punish.
In the following two sections we analyze these cases.
3.2.1 One-Sided Punishment
In order to characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium for the one-sided punishment
case we ﬁrst go to the punishment subgame, look at the punishment behavior of player
2, and then incorporate player 2’s punishment strategy into the effort choices of players
in Stage 1. Since the game we investigate is one of complete information, player 2’s
punishment strategy can be anticipated and player 1 may decide to choose a lower effort
level in an attempt to avoid punishment. Given the lowered effort of player 1, player
2 can be expected to increase his effort level in an attempt to increase his chances of
winning. This is indeed the behavior in the equilibrium of the game when player 2 is
more caring than player 1. This logic is summarized by the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. The effort level of the advantaged player in a tournament with one-sided pun-
ishment stage is weakly less than the effort level of the same player in a tournament without
punishment stage, while the effort level of his disadvantaged player is weakly greater.
The intuition behind this result is clear. Consider the equilibrium deﬁned in Proposi-
tion 1 where no blame exists and hence no punishment is forthcoming. At that equilib-
rium the players equate the marginal costs and beneﬁts of increasing their effort levels
and ﬁnd an effort level that equates them. When blame and punishment are intro-
duced, either that original equilibrium effort level for the advantaged subject calls forth
punishment or it does not. If it does, then while the marginal cost of effort at the old
equilibrium remains the same, the marginal beneﬁt has decreased dramatically because
every unit of effort exerted now calls forth a punishment. Given this decreased marginal
beneﬁt, the only way the advantaged subject can restore equilibrium is to decrease his
effort (or at least not increase it) which is what Proposition 2 predicts. (If no punishment
is forthcoming, then his actions will remain unchanged). For the disadvantaged subject,
in the case where he punishes, either the advantaged subject decreases his effort or he
does not. If he does not decrease his effort then the marginal costs and beneﬁts of effort
remain the same and he will not alter his effort away from no-blame no-punishment
equilibrium. However, if punishment does alter the effort chosen by the advantaged
subject in a downward direction, then the marginal beneﬁt of increased effort (at the old
equilibrium) has increased since his marginal probability of winning has increased (with
18the marginal cost unchanged) and this will lead to an increase in the effort choice of the
disadvantaged.
3.2.2 Two-Sided Punishment
The characterization of equilibrium efforts in the two-sided case is a generalization of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. When the equilibrium effort levels of players in a tournament with two sided
punishment to one sided punishment are compared, either one of the following cases applies:
1. the effort level of the advantaged player goes up while the effort level of the disadvantaged goes
down,
2. the effort level of the disadvantaged player goes up while the effort level of the advantaged goes
down,
3. both effort levels remain the same.
Although the main argument of the proof is similar to Proposition 2, the analysis is
more tedious. The critical step in the equilibrium analysis is to understand the sources
of blame. There are two reasons a player may blame his opponent. The ﬁrst reason is
the effort choices in the tournament stage of the game: if player i exerts more effort than
player j would have exerted in the position of player i, then player j may blame player
i and punish him. The second source of blame is punishment: a player may blame the
other because of his punishment level and retaliate by punishing him back.
Note that given the utility functions that we assume, there is at most one player who
blames the effort choice of his opponent. That is, if player i blames player j due to his
effort choice, it cannot be the case that player j blames player i ’s effort choice as well.
Therefore, in any equilibrium there is at most one player who blames the other due to
effort choices. This observation restricts the number of cases that can be observed in
equilibrium. Consider the following three scenarios:
1. Player i punishes player j for his effort but player j does not retaliate. This
scenario can take place for two reasons. Either player j does not blame player i’s
punishment, or although he blames player i’s punishment, it is too costly for him
to retaliate.
2. Player i punishes j for his effort, player j retaliates. Player i punishes player j.
Player j ﬁnds player i’s punishment blame-worthy and his blame justiﬁes the cost
of punishing player i back.
3. Neither player punishes the other. This scenario can be observed for four reasons:
(a) neither player blames the other for his effort choice, (b) neither player’s blame
19does not justify the cost of punishment, (c) although player i’s blame is high enough
to punish player j, he prefers not to punish him to avoid j’s retaliation, (d) a player
adjusts his effort level to avoid punishment, hence the equilibrium does not exhibit
any punishment.
Scenario 1 is identical to the one-sided punishment case covered by Proposition 2
since it does not matter whether j is not allowed to punish (as in the one-sided case) or
simply chooses not to. Note, however, that player j can be either an advantaged or a
disadvantaged player. If he is advantaged, then we get the same result as Proposition 2
where the advantaged players efforts weakly decrease and the disadvantage weakly
increase. If j is disadvantaged, then the opposite result holds.
In Scenario 2 assume that player j is punished for his effort level. This will reduce his
effort below what it would be in the no punishment case. Now say j retaliates against i
and this retaliation reduces i’s punishment. This will increase j’s effort but his effort can
never increase past the no-punishment level. Depending on whether i was advantaged
or disadvantaged, the effort levels of i and j will either increase or decrease.
In Scenario 3 if reasons (a)-(c) hold then we are simply back in the no-punishment
equilibrium. If reason (d) holds, then that player who anticipates punishment will lower
his effort level to avoid it. This will create an equilibrium where his effort level is lower
while the other player increases his effort, yet no punishment will be observed.
4 Experimental Design
In order to assess whether individuals judge other individuals’ behavior using their own
behavior as a reference (i.e., whether they use the blame-free thought experiment) we
need to know what each subject would do in both possible roles. A novel feature of our
design is that each subject plays in both roles simultaneously. Hence, subjects played in
both roles in each round in two different and independent tournaments.
Let us clarify the setup. Let A,B and C be three subjects, and player 1 and player 2 be
two different roles in the tournament. Subject A plays one tournament (Tournament 1)
in player 2 role when he is matched with subject B who is in player 1 role, and another
one (Tournament 2) in player 1 role when he is matched with subjects C who is in player
2 role. Figure 4 depicts this scenario. All the treatments in our experiment are run
following this structure.
The basic structure of the games implemented in the experiments follows from Sub-
sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Recall that player 1 and player 2 differ in two dimensions. First,
they have different costs of effort in such a way that player 1 is advantaged and player
20Figure 4: Matching scheme in a typical round.
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2 is disadvantaged. Second, disadvantaged player can punish advantaged player in the
one-sided case (Subsection 3.2.1), while the opposite is not true. In the two-sided case
(Subsection 3.2.2) however, both players can punish each other.
As we explained before (Figure 4), in each round of our experiment, each subject
is matched with two different subjects (opponents), therefore being involved in two
independent tournaments: one where he is in the advantaged role and the other where
he is in the disadvantaged role. Subjects are supposed to make their decisions for both
tournaments simultaneously.
An experimental session lasts 34 rounds under different matching protocols, namely
ﬁxed matching (f) and random matching (r). Under r subjects are randomly and in-
dependently matched at the beginning of each round, whereas under f subjects are
matched with other subjects and this match stays ﬁxed.
In some treatments the ﬁrst half (rounds 1-17) of the session is under f (r), while
second half (rounds 18-34) is under r (f). In other treatments the entire session (rounds
1-34) is either f or r. In sum we have four matching schemes: fr, rf, ff, and rr, where,
for instance, fr means rounds 1-17 are f and rounds 18-34 are r.
In treatments where matching scheme is fr or rf, when subjects enter the lab they
are told that the experiment is divided in two different parts, with the ﬁrst one lasting
for 17 rounds. Only when the ﬁrst part is over do the subjects receive instructions for
the second part of the session.
The ﬁnal deﬁning factor of our design concerns the information that the subjects
are given between the tournament and punishment stages of the game. We have two
information regimes. In the low information regime (l), after the subjects choose effort in
the tournament stage but before they make their punishment decision, they are given the
information only about the effort choices of their opponents in the tournament. We also
have an high information regime (h), where the subjects are given all the information about
the tournament before the punishment stage. That is, in high information treatments
subjects are told the winner of the tournament, payoffs earned in the tournament as well
21as the effort levels. This choice of design allows us to test our hypothesis cleanly since
we can compare subjects’ responses to their opponent’s effort choices as well as their
responses to outcomes that involve random factors beside effort choices.
Overall, we have four different treatments: 1-fr-ll, 1-rf-ll, 2-ff-lh, and 2-rr-lh. The
notation is self explanatory. For instance 2-ff-lh means that the treatment involves two-
sided punishment, the matching protocol is ﬁxed in both halves of the session and, while
in the ﬁrst part of the experiment the subjects observed efforts before the punishment
stage, in the second part of the experiment they observed the outcome payoffs of the
tournament as well as the efforts.
We chose the tournament’s parameter values following SW. Particularly, subjects’ ef-
fort levels were limited to the interval [0,100] (¯ e = 100.) We set α = 2 and we say that
a subject is in the disadvantaged role if the cost of effort is given by c(e) = αe2/150
(c = 150), otherwise we say that subject is in the advantaged role. The random shocks
that determine the outcome of the tournament lie in the range (−60,60) (a = 60). The
prizes of the tournaments are M = 204 and m = 86. Additionally, we endowed each
player with D = 68 punishment points when they were in the disadvantaged role. Ev-
ery punishment point assigned to his opponent reduced his payoff by 3 punishment
points. Every punishment point he kept was converted into US Dollars at the rate 1
point=$0.0015, while the exchange rate for each point earned in the tournament was
$1/322 points (h ≈ 1.45 by exchange cross-rate.)
All the sessions were conducted at the Center for Experimental Social Science lab
at New York University with a total of 68 participants, all students at that university.
The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [13]). Sessions
lasted for about one hour and a half and participants received an average payment of
$24 dollars. All parameter values and procedures were common-knowledge. Table 1
presents our experimental design.
5 Results
In this section we will present our results by answering a set of questions generated by
our theory.
5.1 Question 1: Do Subjects Punish when They Should
According to the Theory of Blame-Freeness?
In the context of our experiments, blame-freeness is, ﬁrst and foremost, a theory of pun-
ishment or at least reciprocity. Hence, we will begin by investigating punishments. As
22Table 1: Experimental design.
Treatment Matching Protocol Information Regime
1-fr-ll
Fixed: rounds 1-17 Low: rounds 1-17
Random: rounds 18-34 Low: rounds 18-34
1-rf-ll
Random: rounds 1-17 Low: rounds 1-17
Fixed: rounds 18-34 Low: rounds 18-34
2-ff-lh
Fixed: rounds 1-17 Low: rounds 1-17
Fixed: rounds 18-34 High: rounds 18-34
2-rr-lh
Random: rounds 1-17 Low: rounds 1-17
Random: rounds 18-34 High: rounds 18-34
we have stated before, while blame-freeness is a sufﬁcient condition for no punishment,
blameworthiness is only a necessary condition. Put differently, when a subject chooses
more effort in the advantaged role than his advantaged opponent does against him while
he is in the disadvantaged role, then our theory predicts unambiguously that we should
see no punishment forthcoming. However, when a subject in the same position chooses
less effort, then whether we see punishment occurring will depend on the cost of pun-
ishment, its impact as a deterrent to the advantaged subjects, and the caring parameters
of the subjects’ utility functions. If the cost of punishment is sufﬁciently high, the blame
sufﬁciently small or the beneﬁts sufﬁciently low in the eyes of the subjects, then we
would not expect to observe any punishments.
In most of what we do below we will concentrate on the punishing behavior of the
disadvantaged subjects. This makes more sense since strategically they are the ones for
whom blame and punishment is most natural since they can blame their advantaged
cohort for exploiting their advantaged position by choosing too high an effort level. In
our one-sided punishment treatment, only the disadvantaged were allowed to punish
so our focus on disadvantaged subjects is certainly natural there. While the advantaged
subjects in our two-sided punishment treatment can also blame their disadvantaged
cohorts by comparing what the disadvantaged subjects chose with what he would have
chosen if he were disadvantaged, we think that comparison is less interesting. Still, at
the end of this section we will investigate the punishing behavior of the advantaged
subjects as well where indeed we will ﬁnd some surprising results.
5.1.1 Punishment Levels: Disadvantaged Subjects
Before we look into how closely the punishing behavior of our disadvantaged subjects
conformed to our theory, let us describe the amount of punishment existing in the exper-
23iment in general. Figure 5 presents the average levels of punishment made by subjects
in the disadvantaged role in both the one-sided and two-sided punishment treatments
over their 34 rounds history. What is worth noting here is that mean punishment lev-
els are clearly above zero so that punishment was an alternative employed by at least
some disadvantaged subjects. Further, note that these are the punishments sent by the
punisher and that the punishments received were three times this amount.
































































































5.1.2 Adherence to the Blame-Free Theory
Testing for adherence to our theory, as we have indicated above, is slightly tricky since
blameworthiness is only a necessary condition for punishment. However, when one’s ad-
vantaged opponent acts in a blame-free manner, then that is sufﬁcient for non-punishment
and this is what we will look at ﬁrst. To this end, empirically, we say that a disadvan-
taged subject blames his advantaged opponent if his opponent’s effort level is higher
than the effort level he actually chooses when he is in the advantaged position in the
other tournament. With respect to blame-free behavior of one’s advantaged opponent,
we see punishment behavior consistent with our theory 81% of the time. In other words,
when disadvantaged subjects faced advantaged opponents who chose lower effort levels
than they did when placed in their position, they decided not to punish them 81% of the
time. More precisely, of the 1,215 observations where there shouldn’t be punishment,
24we actually observe no punishment in 983 cases.9 This clearly implies that subjects re-
frained from punishing their advantaged opponents when those opponents acted in a
more kind manner than they would if they were in their position.
Taking punishment behavior into account and not just non-punishing behavior, we
see that of the subset of subjects who punished at least once, 73% of them exhibited
behavior that did not violate the blame-free theory at least 50% of the time. This means
they punished only when there was blame and failed to do so when there was none.
More precisely, of the 68 subjects in our experiment 31 never punished, leaving 37 who
did at least once. Such subsets of non-punishers are seen in almost all experiments where
punishing exists since subjects are hesitant to punish their fellow subjects in almost all
laboratory experiments (see, for example, Fehr and Gaechter [11] where punishment
levels are quite low). In the end-of-session questionnaires distributed subjects report
two main reasons for this behavior: the fact that punishment is costly and their unwill-
ingness to hurt their opponents. Both of these reasons are consistent with our theory
since the existence of blame is only a necessary condition for punishment and the cost of
punishment is a reason not to do so. However, caring about one’s opponent means that
subjects have high caring parameters, bi’s, and hence it takes a lot of blame to force them
to punish. In fact, it is not clear how much punishment we should expect in our experi-
ments since subjects with low caring parameters, self-centered individuals, are unlikely
to blame their fellow competitors and therefore unlikely to punish them despite their
low bi in their strategic preference function, while those with high caring parameters are
likely to blame their opponents but, since they care so much about them, unlikely to
punish them. Hence, the level of punishment activity cannot easily be predicted but, as
we have done, we can check for its theoretical consistency when it exists.
Figure 6 indicates the consistency of subject behavior to our theory by that subset of
37 subjects who punished at least once and who were consistent with our theory at least
50% of the time.
Notice that the mean adherence is 68% with two subjects adhering as much as 94%
of the time.
One cannot judge exactly whether this is strong or weak support for our theory be-
cause not punishing blameworthy opponents may still be consistent with blame-freeness
as long as the caring parameter, bi, is high enough and the perceived costs are large
enough. Still, our data indicates that there is a non negligible part of the sample that be-
9There are subjects who never punish. If we look only at those who punish at least once, then that
ﬁgure drops to 63% (635 observations where there was no reason to punish and 403 observations with no
punishment). Still, subjects who never punish are consistent with our theory since they may simply have
very low (or very high) caring parameters or punishment may be costly. Hence the 81% ﬁgure may be
more accurate.
25Figure 6: Relative frequency of blame-free consistency for punishers who are






















































haves according to blame-free principles when it comes to judge other person’s behavior.
To get a better insight into whether disadvantaged subjects punished when they were
supposed to according to the theory of blame-freeness, note that the observed behavior
of subjects would support it if subject j in the disadvantaged role punishes his opponent
subject i whenever j’s effort in the advantaged position is lower than i’s effort in that
same role. Of course these circumstances are only necessary conditions for punishment
so requiring punishment when blame exists is a very strict test. Despite this fact, ceteris
paribus, if our blame-free theory has teeth, it should be true that the probability of
punishment is increasing in the amount of blame and that is a consequence we can
estimate. To do this we deﬁne the variable ∆ as difference between subject j’s effort
when he is advantaged and i’s effort when he is advantaged (while j is disadvantaged).
Since blame is decreasing in this difference, we would expect that the probability of
punishment would decrease with the variable ∆ and hence the coefﬁcients associated
with this variable should be negative.
The ﬁrst column in Table 2 shows the probit regression for the likelihood of punishing
in the disadvantaged role as a function of ∆. We denote the dummy variable that takes
value 1 when a disadvantaged subject punishes by Dp_dis. Note that the coefﬁcient is
negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the larger the deviation of i’s behavior with
respect to j’s behavior (the more negative the variable ∆ is) the more likely j will punish
i. In other words, as i’s behavior gets closer to j’s behavior (in i’s role), it is the less likely
that j will punish i. Given that we are not interested in the cases where ∆ is positive,
26to check the robustness of our results we ran a probit using a variable ∆+, which is the
variable ∆ truncated at zero to the right. The second column reports this regression. The
previous result holds, though signiﬁcance level drops to 10%.10
Table 2: Probit regressions for punishment in disadvantaged role.
Dp_dis Dp_dis Dp_dis
∆ −.004 - -
(.002)∗∗
∆+ - −.005 -
(.003)∗
∆past - - −.007
(.002)∗∗∗
constant −.741 −.808 −.752
(.169)∗∗∗ (.177)∗∗∗ (.175)∗∗∗
N 2,312 2,312 2,244
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by group in the Fix Matching
rounds and by Session in the Random Matching ones.
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1%
level.
For a further test we deﬁne a weaker notion of blame-free justice, which assumes
that if subject j was in i’s position in the past, he will use his own past behavior when
he judges i’s actions. Thus, we construct the variable ∆past that takes the difference
between j’s average effort in the advantaged role in all previous rounds and i’s effort
in the current round. As shown in the third column of Table 2, this variable performs
better than the previous ones in explaining the likelihood of observing punishment.11
This result indicates that subjects may not be comparing the effort of their opponent in
a round to their effort level in that round, but rather to the mean level of their effort in
all rounds up to the current round. This slight generalization yields better econometric
10Unless otherwise indicated, signiﬁcance levels of the regressors used in this paper are calculated with
robust standard errors, where the clustering group is the relevant group of interaction. The Z-tree program
matched subjects into groups of 4 participants and then assigned them to different tournaments. So even
when subjects did not know it, they were interacting in groups of 4. For the ﬁxed matching rounds, the
variable group is used as the relevant group of interaction. For the random matching rounds or sessions
the session is considered as the relevant group of interaction for the clustering.
Reported results are robust to cluster by “session” in the session that started with random matching
and then switched to ﬁxed matching protocol. We did this in order to control for possible behavioral
spill-overs from the ﬁrst to the second half of the session.
11In this regression we have a lower number of observations because the variable ∆past uses at least
one lag, then the ﬁrst round observation is lost. In order to check if the increase in the signiﬁcance level
of the variable is due to this fact we ran a probit regression using the variable ∆ as a regressor for the
observations of rounds 2 to 34. The signiﬁcance level of the variable ∆ does not change with respect to the
regression reported in the ﬁrst column of the table.
27results.
5.2 Question 2: Does Blame-Freeness Explain Our Data
Better Than Competing Theories?
Blame-freeness is different from some other theories of justice (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [12]
or Bolton and Ockenfels [2], utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice) because it is a process the-
ory as opposed to an end-state theory. Put differently, blame-freeness cares about the
actions taken to determine an outcome and not merely the outcome itself. (Remember a
subject’s utility depends on his opponents strategy as well as his material payoff at the
terminal node of the game). Hence, two outcomes with the same payoff vector can yield
a different utility to a player if these outcomes were determined by different strategies,
i.e., strategies that differed in their blameworthiness.
In this subsection we explore whether the prevalent fairness theories in the literature
can explain punishment behavior better than the blame-free hypothesis. The inequality
aversion theories assume that individuals resist outcomes that deviate from the equal
split of the surplus without evaluating the actions that led to the resulting distribution.
In Fehr and Schmidt [12]’s version of this theory, the way that subjects evaluate the ﬁnal
distribution is by comparing the payoffs that each individual got with their own payoff.
Loosely speaking, in the game implemented in this paper, a Fehr and Schmidt [12] indi-
vidual would mainly care about the net payoff that each agent got from the tournament
(i.e. tournament prize minus cost of effort) and based on that comparison he would de-
cide to punish his opponent or not. However, if blame is a motivation for punishment,
then when an opponent behaves in a nasty manner he should be punished whether or
not his nasty behavior caused damage to his recipient. In the context of our tournament
game, a strict theory of blame would indicate that if an opponent took a blameworthy
action but lost the tournament, he is still a candidate for punishment.
To investigate which theory of justice is operating in our experiment we investi-
gated the following probit regression using the data from the high information treatments
where before the punishment stage subjects could see not only what their opponents’
effort choices were but also what their payoffs were, and whether they won or lost the
tournament in that round:
Pr(Dp = 1) = α + β1∆ + β2∆π + β3Dw + β4(Dw × ∆π) + β5∆past
where Dp is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there is punishment by a subject.12
12When we distinguish advantaged and disadvantaged subjects we write Dp_adv and Dp_dis respectively.
28∆ is our now familiar difference variable which indicates blame when it takes a negative
value and no blame otherwise, ∆π is the difference in payoffs between the players in
the tournament stage, Dw is a dummy variable indicating whether the disadvantaged
subject won the tournament or not, and ∆past is the difference between one’s advantaged
opponents effort this period and the average of a disadvantaged subject’s past effort
choices when playing the advantaged role. Clearly, if blame is the main motivation for
punishment we would expect that the coefﬁcient associated with the ∆ (or ∆past) would
be signiﬁcant and all other coefﬁcients to be insigniﬁcant. If inequality aversion was
important then we should see a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for ∆π variable. (We also ran the
regression for subjects in the advantaged role in our two-sided punishment treatment
which we will discuss later).
Table 3 presents the results for the probit regression for both subjects in the disadvan-
taged and advantaged roles. After testing for differences in behavior across treatments
we pool all observations.
Table 3: Probit regressions for punishment:
two-sided treatments – disadvantaged and advantaged subjects.
Dp_dis Dp_dis Dp_adv Dp_adv
∆ −.008 - −.008 -
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)
∆past - −.017 - −.017
(.005)∗∗∗ (.002)
∆π −.006 −.006 −.002 −.002
(.005) (.005) (.001)∗ (.011)
Dw 1.583 1.674 .550 .584
(1.195) (1.120) (.455) (.460)
Dw × ∆π −.002 −.002 −.006) −.007
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.005)
Dw × ∆ −.001 .002 −.004 -
(.003) (.004) (.002)∗∗
Dw × ∆past - .002 - −.008
(.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
constant −1.804 −1.918 −.868 −.863
(.701)∗∗∗ (.627)∗∗∗ (.332)∗∗∗ (.343)∗∗∗
N 612 592 612 592
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by group.
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
Looking ﬁrst at the estimates for disadvantaged subjects (ﬁrst two columns) this
29regression offers strong support for our theory. It indicates that when subjects were
offered information about payoffs differences, ∆π, (an end-state distributional variable)
and effort differences, ∆, (a process variable that indicates blame) they focus on the
blame variable to the exclusion of the payoff difference. Such a result is not consistent
with behavior under a theory of inequality aversion. In addition, note that punishment
is not affected by whether a disadvantaged subject won the tournament or not. In other
words, if your opponent chooses a blameworthy effort level but it happens to turn out
that you win the tournament and hence no damaged was caused, that fact does not
change your punishment behavior—it appears as if subjects punish the strategy and not
its consequences.
It is slightly more difﬁcult to separate our theory from those of Rabin [18], Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger [5], and Falk and Fischbacher [10] (which we will refer to as Rabin
et al.) but, given our data, the two theories do make different predictions for when the
disadvantaged subjects should punish. While both theories predict punishment when
one’s opponent does something nasty (or their inferred intensions were nasty), they dif-
fer as to what nasty means. For Rabin et al., in the context of our tournament game,
an advantaged opponent is nasty if he chooses a too large effort, i.e., one that decreases
the probability of winning for his disadvantaged opponent unfairly. So nastiness is an
increasing function of the difference between the effort levels of the advantaged and dis-
advantaged subjects since that translates directly into a difference in the probability of
winning. On the contrary, in our theory an advantaged subject is nasty if he chooses
a level of effort which is higher than what his disadvantaged opponent would do if he
were in his shoes. To capture which type of nastiness is operational in our data we ran
a probit regression where the left-hand variable was the usual dichotomous variable in-
dicating punishment or not (Dp_dis) while the right-hand variables were our difference
variable ∆ described above (which captures blame) and the difference in the probability
of winning given the effort levels of the subjects (∆prob)—which attempts to capture the
Rabin et al. notion of nastiness. The results of this regression are presented in Table 4
below.
As can be seen, the only signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is ∆, which captures our notion of
blame. In other words, it appears as if the motivation for punishment is best explained
by a subject placing himself in the place of his opponent and performing a counterfactual
thought experiment rather than simply noticing that one’s opponent chose a high (and
therefore nasty) effort level. In short, an advantaged opponent’s action is only nasty if
it was something that the disadvantaged subject would have not done if he were in that
postilion. Absolutely high effort levels are not, per se, nasty nor are big differences in
effort levels between advantaged and disadvantaged subjects.
30Table 4: Probit regression for punishments in disadvantaged role:











Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by group in the ﬁxed matching rounds
and by sessions in the random matching ones.
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1% level
5.2.1 Punishment Behavior: Advantaged Subjects
Up until now all of our analysis of the blame-free hypothesis centered around the be-
havior of the disadvantaged subject. However, it is possible that the advantaged subject,
despite the fact that he is advantaged, might still blame his disadvantaged subject for his
actions and punish him. What we will attempt to establish below is that while the pun-
ishments of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects appear similar, advantaged subjects
appear to punish for different reasons than disadvantaged subjects.
To get a ﬁrst glimpse into the behavior of advantaged subjects, consider the his-
tograms in Figure 7. This ﬁgure presents the frequency of different punishment levels
by advantaged and disadvantaged subjects in our two-sided punishment treatment, the
only sessions where the advantaged subjects could punish. As we see there does not
seem to be any signiﬁcant difference in the incidence or distribution of punishment be-
tween advantaged and disadvantaged subjects. More precisely, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test indicates that these two distributions are not different (p = 1.00). If we restrict our-
selves to the punishment behavior of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects when they
punish only blame-worthy acts, then again we see that there is no difference between
the punishment behavior of these two groups (p = 1.00). In other words, if punish-
ment behavior is different between these two groups it is not due to different rates of
punishment, but rather the circumstances under which they punish.
To investigate whether our blame-free theory explains the punishment behavior of
advantaged subjects, we reran our probit regression that was previously run for disad-


































vantaged subjects, on advantaged subjects. This probit regression explains the proba-
bility of punishment as a function of our Difference variable. The results of this probit
regression is presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Probit regressions for punishment in advantaged role.
Dp_adv Dp_adv Dp_adv
∆ −.001 - -
(.001)
∆+ - −.003 -
(.003)
∆past - - −.001
(.001)
constant −.951 −.989 −.961
(.328)∗∗∗ (.328)∗∗∗ (.339)∗∗∗
N 1,224 1,224 1,118
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by group in the ﬁxed matching
rounds and by session in the random matching ones.
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1%
level.
Note that while in the same regression run for disadvantaged subjects (Table 2) all
three variables were signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level, the only signiﬁcant variable here
in any of the three regressions is the constant term. In other words, blame-freeness does
not seem to do a good job of explaining behavior amongst our advantaged subjects.
32There may be a number of reasons for this asymmetry. For example, advantaged sub-
jects may have a very different blame function than disadvantaged subjects since they
are in a favored position. Further, recall that in the experiment subjects were randomly
assigned to their positions. Hence, an advantaged subject may not feel entitled to his ad-
vantaged position and may not blame his disadvantaged opponent for choosing a high
effort and hence, may not wish to blame him for doing so. This same logic would have
the opposite effect on disadvantaged subjects since any excessive effort by advantaged
subjects may be viewed as unfair since disadvantaged subjects may feel that their advan-
taged opponents are not entitled to their advantage and therefore, not entitled to exploit
it by choosing a high effort level. In other words, the technology of blaming changes
when one is in an entitled role especially, in one which he is randomly placed.
Despite the fact that blame does not appear to explain punishment behavior well for
advantaged subjects, it is still true that such subjects do punish their disadvantaged co-
horts and so the question remains as to what exactly explains their behavior. Returning
to Table 5, we see that while in the high information treatment, the only variable that
was signiﬁcant in explaining the punishment behavior of disadvantaged subjects was
our ∆ variable. When we look at the same regression run for advantaged subjects on
the right hand side of Table 5, we see that these subjects seemed to care about the payoff
differences ∆π and the interaction term associated with winning (Dw) and ∆ variable.
The fact that the interaction variable has a negative coefﬁcient associated with it indi-
cates that advantaged subjects appear to punish according to blame-free principles only
when they lose, which is interesting since losing seems to spark a blaming reaction. In
summary, advantaged subjects seem to focus on different variables than disadvantaged
subjects do to guide their punishment behavior, variables that are not entirely consistent
with our blame-free hypothesis or variables that are consistent in a more indirect way.
5.3 Question 3: Do Subjects Make Their Effort Decisions in a
Manner Consistent with the Theory of Blame?
Given our Proposition 2 we would expect that, in comparison to a treatment where no
punishments were allowed, the effort levels of the advantaged subjects would fall and
those of the disadvantaged subjects would rise when one-sided punishment is intro-
duced. This is so because an advantaged subject, fearing retaliation from a punishing
(and blaming) disadvantaged subject, may decide to cut back on his effort in order to
ward off costly punishments. In response, the disadvantaged subject then takes advan-
tage of the reduced effort of his advantaged opponent and increases his effort. How
large these changes are will depend on the distribution of caring parameters (the bi’s)
33and, since these are not induced in the experiment, we can only make qualitative predic-
tions here. Still we expect to see effort levels of the advantaged subjects fall and those of
the disadvantaged subjects increase when one-sided punishments (and two-sided pun-
ishments as well) are introduced.
Data relating to this question can be seen in Figure 8 where we present the round-by-
round mean effort choices of subjects in our one-sided punishment treatments as well as
those same means for the SW experiment where no punishment was permitted.13
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As we can see, the mean effort of advantaged subjects changes dramatically when
punishments are made available and in the direction of the theory, but the same is not
true for disadvantaged subjects. More precisely, while there is a dramatic drop in ef-
fort levels from the no-punishment treatment among the advantaged subjects, the effort
levels of the subjects playing the disadvantaged role is actually lower. This latter result
is true because in the no-punishment experiment of SW, disadvantaged subjects over
exerted effort dramatically in an attempt to match the effort levels chosen by the advan-
taged subjects and, in essence, created a rat race that was eliminated when punishment
was allowed.
In our two-sided punishment treatment (see Figure 9) we ﬁnd the same results. Again
13Note that the SW experiments lasted only 20 rounds as compared to the 34 rounds in our experiments
here. In addition, note that we have sorted our data by matching regime so that the—line represents the
means of the subjects under the random matching regime while the—line presents those of the subjects
under the ﬁxed matching regime.
34the efforts of the advantaged subjects decrease when the possibility of punishment exists
and those of the disadvantaged subjects drop as well. This is true whether we have effort
or outcome treatment or ﬁxed or random matching, except in the case of outcome and ﬁxed
matching where for advantaged subjects we see a small over exertion of effort compared
to the no punishment theoretical benchmark. Meanwhile for disadvantaged subjects
there is no signiﬁcant change.


















































































































































































In summation, when comparing the behavior of subjects with and without punish-
ment possibilities, it appears as if the qualitative predictions of our blame-free theory
are born out. This is seen in a dramatic fashion when comparing the effort levels of
the advantaged subjects in this experiment to those in SW. With respect to disadvan-
taged subjects, the results differ since when comparing effort levels with and without
punishment the effort levels of the disadvantaged subjects actually decreases rather than
increases, as expected. The lack of conformity in the behavior of our disadvantaged
subjects is easily explained, since in this game without punishment, the subjects were
involved in a high effort rat race where they drastically over exerted effort. When pun-
ishment was instituted this reduced the effort levels of the advantaged so much that
there was no need for the disadvantaged subjects to increase their efforts and hence,
in comparison to the no punishment case, effort levels dropped for the disadvantaged
subjects.
355.4 Treatment Effects: Does Random Matching Have an
Effect on Punishment Behavior?
As you will recall in our experimental design, we vary the matching protocol both within
sessions and across sessions. While in one session subjects interacted in the same pairs
for the ﬁrst half of the session and were randomly re-matched to new opponents every
round of the second half of it, in the other session the sequence was reversed. Mann-
Whitney test for punishment behavior in these two sessions does not allow us to reject
the hypothesis that both samples come from the same distribution. We can then conclude
that the sequence of the matching protocol does not alter punishment behavior.
To substantiate this fact we ran a simple probit regression where the dependent vari-
able was the dummy Dp_dis, and the right-hand side variables were our difference vari-
ables, ∆, ∆+ (truncated difference), and ∆past (mean of past differences), dummy variable
Dr, indicating whether it is random matching or not, and an interaction term for these
two variables. The results are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: The impact of random matching.
Dp_dis Dp_dis Dp_dis
Dr −.010 .031 .039
(.345) (.358) (.367)
∆ −.005 - -
(.002)
∆self - −.009 -
(.003)
∆+ - - −.007
(.004)
∆ × Dr .003 - -
(.003)
∆self × Dr - .004 -
(.004)
∆+ × Dr - - .004
(.005)
constant −.738 −.736 −.827
(.195) (.196) (.184)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by group in the ﬁxed matching
rounds and by session in the random matching ones.
∗ Signiﬁcance at 10% level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 5% level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at 1%
level.
As we can see, the dummy variable Dr is never signiﬁcant in any regression. This
indicates that the motivation for blame (and punishment) is independent of whether the
36subjects is matched repeatedly with the same subject. If blame is at work it is a type of
disembodied blame that is not attached to a person but rather to the act taken even by
an anonymous other.
6 Conclusions
This paper was motivated by the thought that if we are to understand reciprocity as
a reward for kind behavior and punishment for unkind behavior then we will need
an operational deﬁnition of what kindness means in strategic situations. This paper
provides such a deﬁnition which we call blame freeness. This view of kindness requires
a person to place himself in the position of his opponents and ask what he would do
if he were in his strategic position. If he would have acted in a manner that would
have increased his utility (i.e., if he would have been better off playing against himself
rather than his opponent), then he has cause to blame his opponent for his actions and
may punish him if the costs of doing so are not too high. We have then tested this
notion in an experiment involving uneven tournaments where people can be blamed
and punished for their behavior. We tested whether peoples’ punishment behavior is
blame-free consistent and whether they appear to punish when the theory asks then to
a refrain otherwise.
By and large our data provides strong support for our blame-free concept with ap-
proximately 81% of subjects not punishing when they are not supposed to and 73% of
them punishing when they should at least 50% of the time. These estimates are lower
bounds to the adherence of our subjects to the theory since blame is only a necessary
condition for punishment. Thus someone who does not punish when he blames his
opponent, is not inconsistent with the theory. In addition, a set of probit regressions
indicate that this theory may have stronger explanatory powers than theories that focus
on inequality aversion and other intentions-based theories.
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